El artículo se propone mostrar cómo la redefinición de la racionalidad en términos de «Razón fronteriza», realizada por Eugenio Trías, cobra su sentido más profundo al entenderla como propuesta alternativa a las derivas postmodernas de la racionalidad. Aunque la hipótesis puede ser extendida a su uso práctico, nos centramos exclusivamente en el uso teórico de la razón fronteriza. Para ello atendemos a las obras más maduras de la filosofía del límite, realizando un análisis intertextual mediante el que es posible entender (...) algunos pasajes que, leídos de manera aislada, pueden parecer ambiguos o incomprensibles. Este análisis nos permite concluir que la apertura esencial de la «razón fronteriza» hacia el «suplemento simbólico» revela su coherencia y su fuerza hermenéutica más genuina si se la interpreta a la luz de la polémica que la filosofía del límite mantiene con la postmodernidad. (shrink)

Shoemaker (1996) presenteda prioriarguments against the possibility of ‘self‐blindness’, or the inability of someone, otherwise intelligent and possessed of mental concepts, to introspect any of her concurrent attitude states. Ironically enough, this seems to be a position that Gopnik (1993) and Carruthers (2006, 2008, 2009a,b) have proposed as not only possible, but as the actual human condition generally! According to this ‘Objectivist’ view, supposed introspection of one's attitudes is not ‘direct’, but an ‘inference’ of precisely the sort we make about (...) the attitudes of others, an inference that has the advantage in our own case ofonlyour own sensory data and memories, our behavior, and of the context we are in; i.e. we are all substantially self‐ blind. After sorting out a number of methodological and verbal issues, I argue, first, that thea prioriarguments against Objectivism don't succeed, and that Gopnik and Carruthers are right to regard the issue as an empirical one. On the other hand, I think they seriously underestimate the difficulty of establishing Objectivism. It is unlikely there is an inferential procedure from the data of pure sensation, behavior and context to the relevant self‐attributions that would be as spectacularly reliable as people manifestly seem to be. Moreover, there is a simpler model: the mind very likely consists of a panoply of sub‐routines some of whose outputs are ‘tagged’ for their having been so processed, rather in the way that software ‘documents’ are on standard computers. Introspection plausibly consists in a person's simply attending to distinctive constellations of these tags, even though they may lack phenomenal feels. This draws attention to an important independent fact: that much of phenomenology (or ‘what it's like’ to be in a certain state) may be constituted by facts that are not phenomenal. (shrink)

Vygotsky, at the end of his life, advanced a new representation of a psychological system that was ruled by a cognitive-emotional unity, a theorization that remains inconclusive due to Vygotsky's early death. This article discusses the advances made by Vygotsky in the comprehension of human motivation through his concepts of sense and perezhivanie at the end of his work. Through these concepts, he further advanced the discussion of motivation, despite the fact that these concepts have only very recently been considered (...) a relevant part of his legacy in both Russian and Western psychology. This paper discusses the departure from and the historical presentations of the concept of motive in the following two main approaches of Soviet psychology that were mistakenly equated in Western interpretations: Vygotsky's approach, mainly at the first as last moment of his work, and Leontiev's Activity Theory. Based on the final theoretical positions of Vygotsky and of other Soviet authors, and further developing this legacy, this article proposes a new definition of motivation as a specific quality of subjectively configured systems and defines motive as intrinsic to the functioning of all psychological function defines subjective functions as subjectively configured processes. This new proposal of human motivation within a new way of defining subjectivity defines new categories as subjective senses and subjective configurations on which the author bases a specific approach for advancing the topic of subjectivity and motivation within a cultural-historical framework. (shrink)

This paper investigates the differences between ancient Greek and modern ethical naturalism, through the account of the whole classical tradition provided by Cicero in De finibus bonorum et malorum. Ever since Hume’s remarks on the topic, it is usually held that derivations of normative claims from factual claims require some kind of proper justification. It ́s a the presence of such justifications in the Epicurean, Stoic, and Academic-Peripatetic ethical theories (as portrayed in De finibus), and, after a negative conclusion, I (...) argue that we should conceive of this issue within a social-historical perspective: The radical difference between ancient and modern naturalistic ethics is due (in Weber’s terms) to the rationalization processes that generated the modern outlook on nature. (shrink)

L'avantage avec une notion comme celle de l'autre c'est qu'elle est indéterminée. L'inconvénient c'est qu'elle est vide. Mais ce n'est pas en termes de concept qu'il faut la penser. C'est tout au plus, et rien de moins, qu'un axe. Déplacer l'axe égocentré autour duquel tourne notre modernité, telle serait une des contributions de ce recueil. Comment penser l'humanité multiple, le droit, l'identité personnelle à l'épreuve de l'altérité singulière d'autrui? Le parcours choisi va du visible sous l'espèce du corps, du sentir, (...) de la chair ou, si l'on veut, de l'identité et de la culture à l'invisible: la personne objet de respect et le sujet du droit. Question de responsabilité. Question de liberté. Questions ouvertes. (shrink)

A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ?real? laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, in a sense we make explicit. Ceteris paribus laws will carry a plethora (...) of explanatory commitments; and claims that such commitments are satisfied will be as (dis) confirmable as other empirical claims. (shrink)

A survey of innateness in cognitive science, focusing on (1) what innateness might be, and (2) whether concepts might be innate.

Saffran, Newport, and Aslin (1996a) found that human infants are sensitive to statistical regularities corresponding to lexical units when hearing an artificial spoken language. Two sorts of segmentation strategies have been proposed to account for this early word‐segmentation ability: bracketing strategies, in which infants are assumed to insert boundaries into continuous speech, and clustering strategies, in which infants are assumed to group certain speech sequences together into units (Swingley, 2005). In the present study, we test the predictions of two computational (...) models instantiating each of these strategies i.e., Serial Recurrent Networks: Elman, 1990; and Parser: Perruchet & Vinter, 1998 in an experiment where we compare the lexical and sublexical recognition performance of adults after hearing 2 or 10 min of an artificial spoken language. The results are consistent with Parser’s predictions and the clustering approach, showing that performance on words is better than performance on part‐words only after 10 min. This result suggests that word segmentation abilities are not merely due to stronger associations between sublexical units but to the emergence of stronger lexical representations during the development of speech perception processes. (shrink)

Extracting the regularities of our environment is one of our core cognitive abilities. To study the fine-grained dynamics of the extraction of embedded regularities, a method combining the advantages of the artificial language paradigm and the serial response time task was used with a group of Guinea baboons in a new automatic experimental device. After a series of random trials, monkeys were exposed to language-like patterns. We found that the extraction of embedded patterns positioned at the end of larger patterns (...) was faster than the extraction of initial embedded patterns. This result suggests that there is a learning advantage for the final element of a sequence that benefits from the contextual information provided by previous elements. (shrink)

We argue that Recanati burdens his otherwise salutary “Mental File” account of singular thought with an “Actualist” assumption that he has inherited from the discussion of singular thought since at least Evans, according to which singular thoughts can only be about actual objects: apparent singular thoughts involving “empty” terms lack truth-valuable content. This assumption flies in the face of manifestly singular thoughts involving not only fictional and mistakenly postulated entities, such as Zeus and the planet Vulcan, but also “perceptual inexistents,” (...) e.g., Kanizsa figures, rainbows, words and phonemes, as well as hosts of at best metaphysically problematic “objects,” such as properties, numbers, ceremonies, contracts, symphonies, “the sky,” “the rain.” Indeed, reflection on what seems to be the boundless diversity of “things” about which we seem to be able to have singular thoughts strongly suggests that there may be no general metaphysics of objects, much less “acquaintance” and “epistemically rewarding” relations that would distinguish singular from non-singular thought. We recommend that Recanati and other mental file theorists confine the theory to a metaphysically neutral account of singular thought as specific kind of internally “focused” computational state, and not seek any general account of the relation of thought to reality. (shrink)

PIERRE REY. — Connaître personnellement un auteur, c’est un peu superposer une voix à une parole... Après son décès, les médias ont commenté votre relation avec Claude Nougaro. Pourriez-vous nous en dire un mot ?DOMINIQUE BAUDIS. — Le lien entre Claude et moi, c’est évidemment Toulouse. Pour l’anecdote, je l’ai connu au moment..

Theories of organization and management have offered several concepts and models which indicate that organizational values are an important factor for running organizations successfully. A still unexplained question concerns the creation of balanced organizational values, which can support the achievement of several different and even conflicting goals of modern organizations. To explore balanced organizational values in contemporary business practice, we tested different models of organizational values on a sample of Fortune 100 companies. Research results demonstrate that none of the proportions/ratios (...) of balance proposed by the main models of organizational values from existing literature possesses/presents the ideal balance that is currently pursued in the business field. As a conclusion, a new model of balanced organizational values is proposed. (shrink)

Responding to bivalent stimuli slows subsequent performance. In prospective memory research, prospective memory targets can be considered as bivalent stimuli because they typically involve features relevant for both the prospective memory task and the ongoing task. The purpose of this study was to investigate how responding to a prospective memory target slows subsequent performance. In two experiments, we embedded the prospective memory task in a task-switching paradigm and we manipulated the degree of task-set overlap between the prospective memory task and (...) the ongoing task. The results showed consistent after-effects of responding to prospective memory targets. The specific trajectory of the slowing depended on the amount of task-set overlap. These results demonstrate that responding to prospective memory targets results in after-effects, a so far neglected cost on ongoing task performance. (shrink)

This chapter describes some basic, often puzzling features of intentionality, with an eye to its role not so much in ordinary folk ascriptions but in serious psychological explanations, especially in many of Noam Chomsky's own presentations of his theory. It then considers Chomsky's censure of the notion, leading him to deny what would seem to be the explicit intentionalisms on which he seems to rely. Implicit in Chomsky's treatment of grammar is the idea that the positing of the language faculty (...) offers an “abstract” perspective on a physical system (the human brain) that implements the relevant features of the abstracta in ways we currently don’t understand. Two initial problems might be raised for this picture, one regarding inference and the other, generalization. The proposed model is effectively saying that theorists track states and generalizations of the linguistic system in an explicitly representational format, but what the theory is true of need not have such representational properties. (shrink)

Alors que le débat sur le caractère scientifique ou pseudo-scientifique de l’agriculture biodynamique occupe régulièrement le débat public, l’histoire et la philosophie des sciences ne semblent que très peu s’être emparées de ce sujet. La thèse défendue ici est double : tout d’abord, si l’agriculture biodynamique rencontre un relatif succès aujourd’hui, cela tient sans doute au fait que son théoricien, R. Steiner, a été un des premiers à critiquer le paradigme qui domine l’agronomie, ou en tout cas l’agriculture, depuis plus (...) d’un siècle. Cette critique semble d’ailleurs se maintenir dans ses motifs tout au long du XXe siècle, jusqu’à une certaine critique contemporaine de l’agro-industrie et de ses conséquences désastreuses sur l’environnement. Or, et c’est la seconde thèse défendue ici, cette critique semble méconnaître voire occulter la réalité des débats internes qui ont traversé l’agronomie au cours du XXe siècle et qui continuent de l’agiter aujourd’hui : l’agronomie système a ainsi par exemple intégré dans ses objets des éléments de l’agriculture biodynamique. Selon nous, le problème principal est que l’agronomie est souvent abordée selon une approche externaliste, qui doit impérativement être complétée par une approche internaliste afin tout d’abord de distinguer ce qui relève de la science et ce qui relève du mysticisme, et ensuite de saisir toute la richesse historique et épistémologique de l’agronomie. (shrink)

The article gives a graphical interpretation of the concept of risk vulnerability. It shows that in a specific context of binary lotteries the assumption of risk vulnerability adds to prudence what the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion adds to risk aversion. We end the presentation showing that results can be extended to the concept of multiplicative risk vulnerability.

In Entities and Indices, M. J. Cresswell argued that a first-order modal language can reach the expressive power of natural-language modal discourse only if we give to the formal language a semantics with indices containing infinite possible worlds and we add to it an infinite collection of operators $${{\varvec{actually}}}_n$$ actually n and $$ Ref _n$$ R e f n which store and retrieve worlds. In the fourth chapter of the book, Cresswell gave a proof that the resulting intensional language, which (...) he called $${\mathscr {L}}^*$$ L ∗, is as expressive as an extensional variant of it, called $${\mathscr {L}}$$ L, which has full quantification over worlds. In both linguistics and philosophy, Cresswell’s book has been viewed as offering a compelling argument for preferring extensional systems in the study of natural language. In this paper, after providing a model-theoretic definition of the relation being as expressive as that can be applied to Cresswell’s languages $${\mathscr {L}}$$ L and $${\mathscr {L}}^*$$ L ∗, we show that the intensional language $${\mathscr {L}}^*$$ L ∗ is not as expressive as the extensional language $${\mathscr {L}}$$ L. This result, we claim, undermines Cresswell’s argument to the effect that English modal discourse has the power of explicit quantification over worlds. Additionally, we show that $${\mathscr {L}}^*$$ L ∗ does become as expressive as $${\mathscr {L}}$$ L when we add Cresswell’s operator of universal modality $$\square $$ □ to $${\mathscr {L}}^*$$ L ∗, which provides an extra amount of expressive power. Recently, I. Yanovich has advocated a view that is similar to ours in important respects. At the end of the paper we offer a short discussion of his formalism. (shrink)